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A. Adequacy of Notice of Administrative Proceedings at the FCC
Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires
that an agency provide public notice of a possible change in a ruling
which may substantially affect a person's rights and duties.2 The pur-
pose of the notice requirement is to ensure that all affected persons have
a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to participate in the agency's
hearings.' Publication of the notice in the Federal Register is construc-
tive and sufficient notice to persons subject to proposed agency actions.4
The published notice must include a statement of the time, place, and
nature of the proceedings.' In addition, the notice must refer to the legal
authority empowering the agency to propose the rule and must either in-
clude the terms of the proposed rule or describe the issues involved in
the rule." An agency, however, may adopt a modified version of the rule
published in the Federal Register.7 Notice is adequate as long as in-
terested persons are apprised of the issue under an agency's considera-
tion and the agency's final determination of the issue is a specific ruling
1 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976); see Comment, Administrative Law-Ad-
ministrative Procedure-Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 314, 321-28
(background on the Administrative Procedure Act).
2 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976); see Reynolds Metal Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663, 669 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 995 (1978). The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires
that an agency give notice in the FederalRegister of any rulemaking procedures. 5 U.S.C. §
553(b) (1976). The notice must state either the terms or the substance of a rule under con-
sideration, or more broadly, the notice must describe the subjects and issues involved. Id. at
§ 553(b)(3).
3 H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-23, reprinted in [1946] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1195, 1204-05 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1980]; S. REP. No. 752, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess., 15-17, reprinted in [1946] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1195, 1204; see
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969) (APA designed to ensure fairness in
administrative hearings).
See E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1026 (4th Cir.), rev'd in
part, affd in part, 430 U.S. 112 (1976) (published notice in Federal Register is sufficient);
Rodway v. USDA, 514 F.2d 809, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (publication in Federal Register is con-
stuctive notice to public).
5 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1) (1976).
' Id. § 553(b)(2), (3).
1 Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 248 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub
nom. EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 100 S. Ct. 1011 (1980); accord, California
Citizens Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43, 48 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844
(1967).
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within the broad subject matter published in the Federal Register.' In
Spartan Radiocasting Company v. FCC,' the Fourth Circuit considered
whether the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) gave
the public adequate notice of a hearing in which the Commission con-
templated reversing the policy which it had previously established in
thirteen years of hearings.10
In 1965, the Commission first promulgated regulations requiring
television cable companies 1 to carry over their cable the signals of cer-
tain television broadcast stations." In addition, the original regulations
provided that the cable company must comply, in certain circumstances,
with a carried station's request to black out broadcasts carried on the
cable." By enacting the regulations, the Commission sought to protect
the television broadcast stations from competing cable companies. 4 The
' Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 248 (4th Cir. 1979); see Fairfax Nurs-
ing Center, Inc. v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1297, 1301 (4th Cir. 1979) (notice must give interested
persons fair opportunity to comment on proposed regulations); 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3); H.R.
REP. No. 1980, supra note 3, at 1204-05; Note, Administrative Law-Agency Rulemaking
Must Conform Strictly with Requirements of Administrative Procedure Act, 44 FORDHAM
L. REV. 402, 405-08 (1975) (discussion of cases in which court held notices invalid).
619 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1980).
" Id. at 321; Memorandum Opinion and Order, F.C.C. 78-217, 43 Fed. Reg. 16,337, 67
F.C.C.2d 1303, reconsideration denied, Memorandum Opinion and Order, F.C.C. 78-597, 43
Fed. Reg. 38,391, 68 F.C.C.2d 1461 (1978) (denying reconsideration of first memorandum by
holding that Commission gave sufficient notice of issues decided).
" A cable television system is a facility which receives and amplifies the signal a
television station broadcasts. The cable station then redistributes the signals by cable to in-
dividual subscribers. The cable company transmits signals that an antenna either cannot
receive or receives poorly. First Report and Order in Dockets 14895 and 15233, 38 F.C.C.
683, 684 n.1 (1965). Congress did not expressly grant the Commission the power to regulate
cable television. The Commission inferred the power from Congress' statement of the Com-
mission's responsibilities. Id. at 697-700; see Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C.
459 (1962), affd, 321 F.2d 359, 362 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963) (Commission
can regulate cable television).
" 38 F.C.C. at 716-30; see 47 C.F.R. §§ 21.710-21.716 (1965). The Commission's regula-
tions permitted a television broadcast station to compel a cable company to carry its signal.
38 F.C.C. at 717. The broadcast station, however, could compel only a cable company which
served the same television viewing community as the broadcast station to carry the
station's signal. Id.
," 38 F.C.C. at 719-21. The Commission permitted a broadcast station carried by a
cable company to compel the cable company to black out any network programming carried
concurrently with the station's broadcast. Id. The Commission noted that each major net-
work tries to maximize its audience by entering into affiliation agreements with in-
dependently owned television broadcast stations throughout the country. Networks desir-
ing to avoid duplication of their programming affiliate with only one station within a given
radius of the station. Id. at 703 n.29. Because a cable station boosts a broadcast station's
signal, the area a cable station serves may overlap with a broadcast station's area. See note
11 supra. To protect local broadcast network affiliates from distant affiliate competition car-
ried over the cable, the Commission devised the blackout provision. 38 F.C.C. at 719-21.
" 38 F.C.C. at 700. Because the broadcast affiliate transmits its signals over the air,
the station's only source of revenue is broadcasting advertising. The Commission reasoned
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Commission reasoned that the television broadcast stations provide ser-
vice to rural areas which a cable company, because of prohibitive costs,
cannot reach.15 Furthermore, the Commission reasoned that only local
broadcast stations can provide programming suited to local tastes and
needs.18 Because the carry-but-blackout anomaly caused widespread
dissatisfaction within the television industry 7 and throughout the
general public, 8 the Commission held further hearings.
In 1974, the Commission solicited comments from the cable industry
and broadcast stations by publishing a notice in the Federal Register.9
The notice contained a full statement of the issues the Commission
would consider in the hearings.0 In the initial hearings, the Commission
sought to resolve the inconsistency in the policy of compelling a cable
company to carry a station, only to have portions of the company's
broadcast blacked out.2' Although the Commission decided to uphold the
blackout regulations,' in 1975 the Commission published the notice of
further hearings on the carry-but-blackout inconsistency.2 In the second
notice, the Commission expressly rejected an across-the-board exemp-
tion from the blackout regulations but proposed exempting cable sta-
tions which households viewed as much as they viewed the local televi-
sion broadcast stations.24 In the alternative, the Commission proposed
that the competition for advertising from cable television might have an adverse impact on
the broadcast station's revenue. 619 F.2d at 316; 38 F.C.C. at 703-13.
,5 38 F.C.C. at 699.
18Id.
" Members of the cable industry complained that the blackout rules are inequitable,
without proven justification, and contrary to the public interest. Notice of Inquiry and Pro-
posed Rule Making in Docket Number 19995, F.C.C. 74-335, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,873, 12,874, 46
F.C.C.2d 1164, 1164 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Notice].
" Members of the public who subscribed to cable companies complained of being misled
into believing that cable companies would carry signals full-time. First Report and Order in
Docket Number 19995, 52 F.C.C.2d 519, 522, reconsideration granted in part, 56 F.C.C.2d
210 (1975). In addition, subscribers complained of the inconvenience of switching from cable
reception to antenna reception when a cable company blacked out its broadcast. 52 F.C.C.2d
at 522-23.
19 1974 Notice, supra note 17, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,873, 46 F.C.C.2d 1164 (1974).
Id. at 12,875, 46 F.C.C.2d at 1169-70.
619 F.2d at 317. After holding initial hearings on the blackout regulations, the Com-
mission exempted cable companies with less than 1,000 subscribers from the blackout rules.
First Report and Order in Docket Number 19995, 52 F.C.C.2d 519, 549 (1975). The Commis-
sion ruled that the high cost of blacking out stations justified the exemption. Id.
2 52 F.C.C.2d at 522-23, 536-37. The Commission noted that the blackout rules caused
technical problems for the cable companies and frustrated the cable subscribers, but ex-
plicitly upheld the blackout rules and their application to other stations. Id.
" Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making for Docket Number 19995, F.C.C. 75-922,
40 Fed. Reg. 34,395, 34,396 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Notice]. In response to the 1975
notice, the Commission received comments from about 90 parties. Brief for Respondents at,
8, Spartan Radiocasting Co. v. FCC, 619 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1980).
" 1975 Notice, supra note 23, at 34,395.
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exempting cable broadcasts which households received better than they
received the local television broadcast.'
After the 1975 hearings, the Commission concluded in its report that
the alternatives considered could not solve the diverse problems of the
blackout rules."' The Commission expressly upheld the blackout rules,
but allowed exemptions on a case-by-case basis.' The Commission decided
that it would grant an exemption if a cable company could show that the
reception of its signal was better than the protected broadcast station's
signal. 8 In addition, the cable company must show that households viewed
the company's signal as much as the broadcast station's signal and that
an exemption would neither harm the broadcast station financially nor
diminish the quality of programming in the community.' In the report
following the 1975 hearings, the Commission expressly terminated the
proceeding dealing with the blackout exemption."
Despite the agency's statement that the proceedings were ter-
minated, Moscow Television Cable Company (Moscow) petitioned the
Commission for a reconsideration of the decision.3 1 In its petition,
Moscow noted that the Commission could grant sufficient relief without
exempting all cable companies from the blackout rules.32 In response to
Moscow's petition, the Commission published a notice in the Federal
Register in 19771 which stated that Moscow's petition sought an amend-
ment to the blackout regulations.'
In March 1978, the Commission ruled on Moscow's petition and held
that a cable station was not required to delete programming which
' Id at 34,396. The Commission notified interested persons that the Commission
sought to exempt some but not all cable companies from the blackout regulations. Id.
Third Report and Order in Docket Number 19995, 62 F.C.C.2d 99, 102 (1976).
Id. Rejecting even its own proposed rules changes, the Commission reasoned that
any gain from uninterrupted cable service would not offset the lowered quality of a broad-
cast station's services to its community. Id
Id at 102-03.
Id. After the 1975 hearings, the blackout rules remained in effect unless the cable
company carried its burden of proof. See id.
o Id at 103. But see text accompanying notes 52, 61-67 infra.
s, Joint Brief for Intervenors in Support of Respondents at 16, Spartan Radiocasting
Co. v. FCC, 619 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1980). A person aggrieved by an agency's final order may
petition the agency for a reconsideration of the order. 47 U.S.C. § 405 (1976). Moscow Televi-
sion Cable Company (Moscow) petitioned for reconsideration of the Commission's ruling.
Joint Brief for Intervenors at 16. Pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 1.429(e) (1979), the Commission filed
notice of the proceeding. See 42 Fed. Reg. 1521 (1977). In its petition, Moscow conceded the
finality of the Commission's express termination. Joint App. at 195, Spartan Radiocasting
Co. v. FCC, 619 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1980).
Joint App. at 195.
42 Fed. Reg. 1521.
Id In its brief in Spartan, the Commission argued that its first two notices in 1974
and 1975 were sufficient notice of any future proceedings concerning the blackout rules.
Brief for Respondents at 12-19.
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duplicated a television broadcast station's programming. 5 Under the
new ruling, the Commission shifted the burden of proof from the cable
company seeking an exemption from the blackout regulations to the
broadcast station seeking protection. 8 The Commission stressed that a
broadcast station could seek special relief by showing that a failure to
delete competing signals would have a substantial, adverse impact on
the station's services to the community."' In addition, the Commission
emphasized that the shift in the burden of proof did not violate the
underlying policies of the blackout rules.' In response to petitions re-
questing a reconsideration of its new ruling, the Commission affirmed its
decision. 9
The Fourth Circuit first considered the contentions of the Commis-
sion when Spartan Radiocasting Company (Spartan) appealed the Com-
mission's affirmation of the ruling.4" Spartan conceded that the first
notice in 1974 adequately apprised television broadcast stations of the
possibility of an across-the-board exemption to the blackout rules.41 Spar-
tan contended, however, that the 1974 notice became ineffective when
1 Memorandum Opinion and Order, F.C.C. 78-217, 43 Fed. Reg. 16,337, 16,338, 67
F.C.C.2d 1303, 1305 (1978).
1Id at 16,338, 67 F.C.C.2d at 1305. Under the Commission's new ruling, any broadcast
station which is viewed in 25% of the noncable households within a particular area can re-
quire that a cable company carry its broadcast. Id For blackout purposes, however, a broad-
cast station seeking deletion of cable carriage of another broadcast station must show
economic need for the deletion, even if the carried station is from outside the broadcast sta-
tion's area. Id; 619 F.2d at 320. Under the old ruling, the broadcast station only had to show
that duplicative programming would occur to obtain a blackout. First Report and Order in
Dockets 14,895 and 15,223, 38 F.C.C. 683, 719 (1965); see text accompanying notes 11-16
supra.
, 67 F.C.C.2d at 1305.
I& The Commission stated that the new ruling continued to protect network af-
filiates from economic harm and was thereby consistent with its statutory duties. Id; see 47
U.S.C. § 151 (1976); text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
The Commission stated that it did not reverse any policy by shifting the burden of proof.
67 F.C.C.2d at 1305. The policy of protecting network affiliates still remained. Id. The shift
in burden, however, signified a rejection of the broadcast stations' need for protection and
of the goal of maintaining localism in broadcasting. See text accompanying notes 14-16
supra. Even the respondents in their petition noted that the party bearing the burden of
showing need is at a disadvantage. Joint App. at 186.
" Memorandum Opinion and Order, F.C.C. 78-597, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,381, 68 F.C.C.2d
1461 (1978). 40 parties filed petitions for and against reconsideration of the Commission's
new ruling. Brief for Respondents at 12.
Spartan Radiocasting Co. v. FCC, 619 F.2d 314, 321 (4th Cir. 1980). The federal cir-
cuit courts have jurisdiction to set aside all final orders of the Commission. See 28 U.S.C. §'
2342(1) (1976) (Judicial Act); 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1976) (Communications Act). Venue lies either
in the circuit in which the petitioner has his principle office or in the District of Columbia
Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 2343. Since Spartan's principle office is in South Carolina, the Fourth
Circuit properly heard the case.
41 Joint Reply Brief for Petitioners and Intervenors Aligned with Petitioners at 12-13,
Spartan Radiocasting Company v. FCC, 619 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1980).
1981]
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the Commission rejected the unqualified exemption in subsequent hear-
ings and in the 1975 notice.42 With respect to the notice published in the
Federal Register in 1975 that was in effect when the Commission shifted
the burden of proof, Spartan argued that the 1975 notice did not ade-
quately notify interested persons that the Commission would exempt all
cable companies from the blackout regulations.43 The notice proposed
two alternative standards for exemption from the blackout rules which
did not encompass an across-the-board exemption." Alternatively, Spar-
tan argued that the Commission's decision to affirm its exemption ruling
was arbitrary because the Commission failed to consider relevant fac-
tors and failed to provide an explanation for the policy reversal. 5 In
Spartan, the Fourth Circuit ruled against the petitioner on the notice
issue by finding that the Commission did not reverse itself but merely
shifted the burden of proof." The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Commis-
sion's ruling without addressing the petitioner's alternative complaint.
The Fourth Circuit held that the Commission's 1974 notice in the
Federal Register gave Spartan sufficient notice of the Commission's
final decision. 8 The court noted that the 1974 notice emphasized the
necessity of making the blackout rules consistent with the carriage
rules. 9 In addition, the Spartan court noted that the Commission in its
42 1&
' Id. at 13.
" Id. at 26; see text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
' 619 F.2d at 321. An agency may reverse itself if new relevant facts demand recon-
sideration. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 809 (1973). If an
agency completely reverses itself, the agency must set forth the relevant factors for its
decision and state the grounds for rejecting opposing arguments. Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1971); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 219 (4th
Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99
(1977). Without a full explanation, the agency's ruling is arbitrary and capricious. Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416-17 (1971). The appellate court's func-
tion is to determine whether an agency considered all relevant factors in arriving at its deci-
sion and whether the agency clearly stated a rational basis for its decision. Id. The court's
review function is especially important when an agency reverses its position and seemingly
ignores previous policies. 619 F.2d at 324 (Sprouse, J., dissenting); see Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert denied, 403 U.S. 923
(1971). A court must reverse an agency ruling which is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976); see, e.g.,
Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 192-93 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (reversal of well-established agency
policy requires reasoned explanation of reversal); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 219 (4th
Cir. 1975) (agency that does not consider all relevant factors and does not explicitly support
its decision with those factors acts arbitrarily and capriciously).
619 F.2d at 322.
' See id. at 315-22. The Spartan majority noted that the Commission's decision was
within the Commission's authority and expertise. Id. at 322. Spartan, however, did not con-
test whether the Commission overreach its authority. Instead, Spartan contended that the
decision was capricious. Joint Brief for Petitioners at 36-56.
619 F.2d at 322; see text accompanying notes 1-8 supra.
" 619 F.2d at 322.
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first report following the 1974 notice5' singled out the blackout rules for
consideration in future proceedings." The court found that the Commis-
sion had not terminated the proceedings prior to its final decision.2 The
Fourth Circuit reasoned that the Commission's final decision to place the
burden of showing a need for the blackout on the broadcast station was a
reasonably foreseeable alternative for solving the problem of the incon-
sistency between the blackout and carriage rules.53
The dissent in Spartan concurred with the majority on the notice
issue. Recognizing that the Commission may not have published an ade-
quate notice in the Federal Register, the dissent stated that the wide
response of the cable companies and the television broadcasting stations
to the Commission's hearings prior to its final decision overcame any
shortcomings in the Commission's notice.55 The dissent argued, however,
that the Commission did not explain the reason for its reversal on the
issue whether to grant cable companies an across-the-board exemption
from the blackout rules in either its final decision" or its affirmation 7 of
the decision. 8 The dissent, therefore, would have remanded the case to
the Commission for a clear articulation of the grounds for its decision."
The majority in Spartan assumed that the 1974 notice began one
long proceeding that culminated with the Commission's ruling on the
Moscow petition. ' Contrary to the Fourth Circuit's assertion that the
Commission did not terminate the proceeding in the report following the
First Report and Order in Docket Number 19995, 52 F.C.C.2d 519 (1975).
619 F.2d at 322.
' Id at 319.
Id at 322.
Id. at 323.
Id. The dissent in Spartan did not state whether the 1974 notice alone was sufficient
notice to the public of the Commission's final decision. Id. at 323-25. In spite of the wide
response to the 1974 notice, the dissent implied that the tenuousness of the Commission's
notice should be a consideration for remanding the case. Id at 324-25; see text accompany-
ing note 64 infra.
I Memorandum Opinion and Order, F.C.C. 78-217, 43 Fed. Reg. 16,337, 67 F.C.C.2d
1303 (1978).
' Memorandum Opinion and Order, F.C.C. 78-597, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,381, 68 F.C.C.2d
1461 (1978).
" 619 F.2d at 324. The dissent in Spartan reasoned that since the Commission em-
phatically refused to exempt all cable companies from the blackout regulations and con-
sistently adhered to a policy of protecting local broadcasters, the majority should have ex-
amined closely the Commission's reasons for reversing its past position. Id. at 323; see 52
F.C.C.2d at 537 (Commission rejecting complete exemption); 62 F.C.C.2d at 102 (policy of
protecting broadcasters). Since the Commission did not adequately justify its new position,
the dissent argued, the court should have remanded the case to the Commission for
clarification. 619 F.2d at 324-25. The dissent admitted that upon remand, the Commission
might sustain its ruling with clearly articulated reasoning. Id. at 325. The possibility that
the Commission could not sustain its ruling compelled Judge Sprouse to dissent. Id.
619 F.2d at 325; see note 58 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.
19811
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1975 hearings,' the Commission stated that the proceeding terminated
upon the issuance of the report.2 Broadcast stations apparently relied on
the Commission's termination in the 1975 report because only three par-
ties filed petitions in response to the notice in the Federal Register in
1977 of Moscow's petition for reconsideration." The Commission received
over 200 responses to the 1974 notice." Some courts have held that once
an agency terminates a proceeding, it cannot rely on any notice previous
to the termination as effective notice to the public concerning rulings
subsequent to- the termination. 5 The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of
the series of hearings as a single proceeding ignored the Commission's
express termination of the proceedings prior to the Moscow petition.
6
Circuit courts other than the Fourth Circuit generally hold that an
agency's notice is adequate as long as the promulgated regulations are
within either the general purpose of the proposed regulations" or the
guidelines established by the proposed regulations." In addition, some
courts have upheld an agency's notice and final rule where the proposed
regulations implied the possibility of the adopted regulation. 9 Circuit
courts often buttress their holdings by noting either that the complain-
ing party's industry or group was sufficiently represented at an agency's
" 619 F.2d at 319.
62 F.C.C.2d at 102-03.
619 F.2d at 324.
Brief for Respondents at 7.
See National Tour Brokers Ass'n v. United States, 591 F.2d 896, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(agency cannot reverse decision after final determination without republishing notice); Ar-
lington Oil Mills, Inc. v. Knebel, 543 F.2d 1092, 1099 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 545 F.2d
168 (5th Cir. 1976) (decisions subsequent to final determination require publication of new
notice). But see Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
cert denied sub nom. WHDH, Inc. v. FCC, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (agency order not final until
30 days after issuance of order).
619 F.2d at 325 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
Laketon Asphalt Refining, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 624 F.2d 784,
790-91 (7th Cir. 1980) (notice adequate because promulgated regulations within proposed
purposes of establishing preferences among oil refineries); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA,
504 F.2d 646, 659 (1st Cir. 1974) (notice adequate because promulgated regulations effected
agency's published goal of reducing parking); Mount Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442
F.2d 470, 488 (2d Cir. 1971) (notice adequate because promulgated restrictions on showing of
feature films within published purpose of need for limiting network control over program-
ming); California Citizens Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43, 48 (9th Cir. 1967) (notice
adequate because promulgated regulations within published purpose of limiting uses of
citizen band radios).
Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
(promulgated regulations within guidelines established by proposed regulations governing
priorities of broadcast stations).
" American Iron and Steel Institute v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 293 (3d Cir. 1977) (notice
adequate because the proposed regulations implied possibility of stringent effluent regula-
tions); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (notice ade-
quate because proposed regulations implied continuance of television industry self-
regulation of programming).
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hearings70 or that the proposals and comments advanced during an
agency's proceedings foreshadowed the adopted proposal.71 Where the
agency did not publish any notice of hearings on the regulations in the
Federal Register2 or the final regulations differ substantially from the
proposed regulations, 7 however, the courts will strike down the
agency's regulations. In Spartan, the contents of the 1974 notice enabled
the Fourth Circuit to uphold the Commission's regulations and thereby
remain consistent with other circuit courts.
Prior to Spartan, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of adequacy
of an agency's notice by examining the contents of the notice itself," the
regulated industry's response to the notice and its representation at the
agency's hearings,7" and the impact of the promulgated regulations on in-
terested persons.7 The court in Spartan emphasized only the contents of
the 1974 notice7 and the television broadcast industry's response to the
1974 notice.:' Had the Fourth Circuit considered the significance of the
small number of responses to the notice of Moscow's petition,7' and the
great impact the shift in the burden of proof would have on the broad-
cast industry," the court may have decided that the 1974 notice was in-
adequate. By ignoring these factors, the court was able to conclude that
the Commission's notice was adequate."
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Spartan comports not only with its
own prior decisions, but also with the decisions of several other circuits.
The Spartan court recognized that promulgated rules often differ from
11 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 48 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) (ma-
jority of petitoner's industry at hearings supported change adopted); South Terminal Corp.
v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 657-59 (1st Cir. 1974) (representatives of petitioners at public hear-
ings). Contra Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1019 (3d Cir. 1972) (all interested
persons must be notified of impending hearings).
71 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1976); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA,
504 F.2d 646, 657-58 (1st Cir. 1974).
" Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 171 (6th Cir. 1973), affd sub nom. Big
Rivers Elec. Corp. v. EPA, 523 F.2d 16 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); Texaco, Inc.
v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 744-45 (3d Cir. 1969).
Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1019 (3d Cir. 1972).
' See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 1979) (content of
notice implied promulgated regulations).
7 See E.I. de Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1025-26 (4th Cir. 1976)
(notice adequate because industry took part in agency's hearings); Maryland v. EPA, 530
F.2d 215, 222 (4th Cir. 1975) (notice inadequate because industry at hearings did not discuss
promulgated regulations).
7 See Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 222 (4th Cir. 1975) (notice inadequate because
drastic impact of parking regulations not implied by notice).
I See 619 F.2d at 322 (initial notice adequate because stated inconsistency in blackout
rules).
" See id. at 317, 322 (numerous responses to notice simply insufficient to overcome
cable companies' superior arguments).
See text accompanying note 63 supra.
'0 See text accompanying notes 14-16, 38 supra.
"1 619 F.2d at 322.
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the agency's proposed rule because of additional information an agency
receives after it published a notice of hearings in the Federal Register.2
To require republication of the rules and a new round of hearings and
comment before promulgating rules which differ only slightly from an
agency's proposed rules would place an impractical burden on an
agency." If a published notice contemplates the substance of an adopted
regulation and the industry has been well represented at hearings held
pursuant to the notice, the Fourth Circuit, as well as other circuits, will
uphold the notice.
The Spartan court implicity issued a warning to many industries
regulated by federal agencies. Television broadcast stations and cable
companies, with their competing interests in raising revenue and com-
manding audiences must be prepared at all points in an administrative
proceeding to rebut their opponents' arguments." A party to an agency's
proceeding cannot rely on that agency's determinations until all parties
are heard and all findings are final and nonappealable.1
5
STEVEN J. TALEVI
B. Reviewability of the FMCS' Decision to Establish a Board of
Inquiry and the NLRB General Counsel's Decision Not to Issue
an Unfair Labor Practices Complaint
Judicial review is the primary check against illegal action by a
federal administrative agency.1 Congress provided for judicial review of
agency action when it passed the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).2
" Id at 321-22; see International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 n.51
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (purpose of hearing defeated if agency must publish notice of each change in
a rule resulting from new information).
See 619 F.2d at 322.
8 Id
Id Although the Spartan court did not so state, an interested party must assume
that a notice's effectiveness terminates when an agency terminates its proceeding and when
the agency's findings are no longer appealable under §§ 151 and 405 of Title 47. See note 31
supra.
I B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 429 (1976). An administrative agency is that part
of the executive branch of the government affecting the rights of private parties through
adjudication, rulemaking, investigation, prosecution, negotiation, settlement or informal ac-
tion. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 1.01 (3d ed. 1972).
2 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976 & Supp. I 1977 & Supp. II 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that a person legally wronged, adversely
affected or aggrieved by an "agency action" is entitled to judicial relief therefrom. 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1976). The APA affords judicial review of a broad range of agency actions. An "agency
action" is "the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." Id § 551(13). Under the APA, an "order" is
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The United States Supreme Court has construed the APA as affording a
broad presumption of reviewability to an individual adversely affected
or aggrieved by an agency action However, not all actions are subject
to judicial review. Section 701(a)(1) of the APA specifically excludes
from review actions which the statute creating the agency bars from
review. Similarly, section 701(a)(2) 6 states that actions committed by law
to agency discretion are not reviewable1 Despite the APA's clear state-
ment of the law of reviewability, courts frequently must decide if a par-
ticular agency action is reviewable.8 The Fourth Circuit recently held in
Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Irving9 that the refusal of
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) General Counsel" to issue
all or part of a final disposition by an agency of a matter other than rule making. Id. § 551(6).
A "rule" is all or part of an agency statement designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe
law or policy or concerning the organization, procedure, or practice of an agency. Id. §
551(4). "Person" within the meaning of the APA "includes an individual, partnership, cor-
poration, association, or public or private organization other than an agency." Id. § 551(2).
Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967).
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1976).
5Id.
8 Id. § 701(a)(2).
Id.
See, e.g., Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104-07 (1977) (decision of Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare not to reopen previously adjudicated claim for social security
benefits held not reviewable); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 156-57 (1970) (ruling by Comptroller of Currency permitting national banks to
make data processing services available to others banks and bank customers found
reviewable); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581-83 (1958) (per curiam) (Secretary of
Army's decision to issue a less than honorable discharge is reviewable).
9 610 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980).
10 The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) [the
Wagner Act, as amended, hereinafter cited as the NLRA], constituted a congressional at-
tempt to advance industrial peace by statutorily establishing employees' rights to organize,
bargain collectively and picket and strike peacefully. A. Cox, D. BoI & R. GORMAN, LABOR
LAW 80 (8th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Cox]. The Wagner Act created the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which functioned both to conduct union representation
selection proceedings and to handle unfair labor practices charges. Id. at 81. The NLRB had
control of all aspects of unfair labor practices cases, from investigating the merits of the
charges and prosecuting meritorious charges to trying and adjudicating cases. Id. The
General Counsel originally offered legal advice, but was subservient, to the NLRB. M. Mc-
Clintock, The Unreviewable Power of the General Counsel-Partial Enforcement of the
Labor Act 12 GONZ. L. REV. 79, 90 (1976) [hereinafter cited as McClintock]. The concentra-
tion of prosecutorial and judicial power in the Board's arena engendered considerable
criticism. Id.
Partly in response to this criticism, Congress created the Office of the General Counsel
with the passage of the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Amendments) of
1947, 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976). McClintock at 86. The Taft-Hartley Amendments separated
the functions of the NLRB and the General Counsel. The General Counsel assumed an ex-
clusively prosecutorial role while the NLRB assumed a purely adjudicative role in unfair
labor practices cases. Id. at 91. See generally H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT
TO TAFT HARTLEY (1950).
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an unfair labor practices complaint 1' was not reviewable. 2 In Sinai
Hospital of Baltimore, Inc. v. Horvitz,"1 the Fourth Circuit found that the
decision by the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Ser-
vice (FMCS)"4 to form a board of inquiry"5 to mediate a labor dispute also
was not subject to judicial review."6 In both Associated Builders and
Sinai Hospital, the court warned that had the decision of either the
General Counsel or the FMCS Director resulted from a clear mistake of
law, the otherwise unreviewable decisions would have been subject to
review." The court found, however, that no such mistake occurred in
either case. 8
In Sinai Hospital, a collective bargaining agreement 9 existed be-
tween an employer, Sinai Hospital (Sinai), and the union representing
Sinai's employees.'O Several months before the agreement was to expire,
Sinai advised the union of its desire to terminate or modify the
" An "unfair labor practice" is any of several acts by employers, labor organizations or
agents of labor organizations that might disrupt stable labor relations and thereby impede
interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), (b), (e) (1976). "Employer" means "any person ac-
ting as an agent of an employer." Id. § 152(2). The definition specifically excludes, among
others, federal, state and municipal government employers. Id. A "labor organization" is
any organization in which employees participate and which exists to deal with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, and terms and conditions of employment. Id. § 152(5).
Any person may file an unfair labor practices charge with the NLRB Regional Director
for the region in which the unfair labor practice occurred or is occurring. 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.9,
102.10 (1980). The Regional Director then investigates the charge. Id § 101.4 If the in-
vestigation indicates that formal proceedings are warranted, the Regional Director issues a
formal complaint charging an unfair labor practice. Id § 102.15. The Regional Director will
issue a complaint if there is reasonable cause to believe a violation has occurred. McClin-
tock, supra note 10, at 88. If the Regional Director determines that a complaint is not
necessary, the charging party may appeal the determination to the General Counsel. 29
C.F.R. § 102.19(a) (1980). The General Counsel may either sustain the Regional Director's
decision or direct that further action be taken. I&. § 102.19(c).
12 610 F.2d at 1226.
's 621 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1980).
1, Congress established the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) to pre-
vent or minimize disruptions of the free flow of interstate commerce that can result from
labor disputes by assisting with the mediation and conciliation of labor disputes. 29 U.S.C. §
173(a) (1976). Although FMCS intervention in labor disputes in other industries is subject to
FMCS discretion, the statute mandates that the FMCS attempt to achieve a settlement
once the FMCS receives notice of a labor dispute involving the health care industry. See i&
§ 158(d); Cox. supra note 10, at 536; notes 23 & 24 infra.
15 See note 24 infra
" 621 F.2d at 1271.
" Id at 1269; 610 F.2d at 1227; see text accompanying notes 36-37 & 102-105 infra.
" 621 F.2d at 1269; 610 F.2d at 1227.
1' A collective bargaining agreement is a contract between a union and an employer
specifying terms and conditions of employment. Cox. supra note 10, at 577-81.
" Brief for Appellee at 1. The parties to the contract included Sinai, the National
Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, RWDSU, AFL-CIO, and Division 1199E of
that union. Brief for Appellant at 5. Since the interests of the second and third parties were
the same, this note considers them as one entity.
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contract.21 Sinai subsequently informed the FMCS, the administrative
agency charged with mediation of labor disputes,' that a dispute existed
between itself and the union.' The Director of the FMCS then appointed
a Board of Inquiry (Board) to investigate the dispute between Sinai and
the union.24 After the establishment of the Board, the Director issued an
21 Brief for Appellee at 1. Section 8(d) of the NLRA mandates that the party to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement pertaining to the health care industry who wishes to terminate
or modify such agreement must notify the other party to the agreement at least 90 days
prior to the expiration date of the agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4)(A) (1976).
See note 14 supra.
621 F.2d at 1268. The party desiring termination or modification of a collective
bargaining agreement must advise the FMCS of the existence of a dispute. 29 U.S.C. §
158(d)(3) (1976). The terminating or modifying party must inform the FMCS within 60 days
of serving notice upon the other party to the agreement. Id. § 158(d)(4)(A); see note 21 supra.
Courts have concluded that the 60 day period specified in the statute is a drafting er-
ror. See, e.g., Affiliated Hosps. of San Francisco v. Scearce, 583 F.2d 1097, 1098 n.3 (9th Cir.
1978); Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Scearce, 561 F.2d 547, 549-50 n.2 (4th Cir. 1977). Rely-
ing on the legislative history, courts have assumed that Congress intended that the ter-
minating or modifying party inform the FMCS of its intent to terminate or modify the col-
lective bargaining contract within 30 days of notice to the other party. Id The statute
originally required that the terminating or modifying party notify the FMCS 30 days before
that agreement was to expire. Id The statute still mandates notice of only 30 days in in-
dustries other than health care. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(3) (1976). Conscious of the potentially
disastrous effects of a strike in the health care industry, Congress wanted the FMCS to
have 60 days to mediate a settlement between the parties to an imperiled collective bargain-
ing agreement. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Scearce, 561 F.2d at 549-50 n.2. Congress ac-
complished this goal by extending the time period within which the terminating or modify-
ing party must give notice to the other party from 60 to 90 days in the case of the health
care industry. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1)(A) (1976). For the FMCS to have the intended 60
days' notice prior to expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, it must receive notice
within 30, not 60, days of notice to the other party. See Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc. v.
Scearce, 561 F.2d at 549-50 n.2.
" Brief for Appellant at 9. The Director of the FMCS may establish a board of inquiry
to investigate labor disputes within 30 days of receiving notification of a desire to terminate
or modify a collective bargaining agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1976). The board of inquiry
investigates the labor dispute and recommends possible solutions to the dispute. Id. To
establish a board, the Director must issue an opinion that "a threatened or actual strike or
lockout affecting a health care institution will, if permitted to occur or continue, substantially
interrupt the delivery of health care in the locality concerned." Id. The statute appears to
require issuance of an opinion as a jurisdictional prerequisite to the formation of a board of
inquiry. See id. Although in Sinai Hospital the Director appointed the Board before he
issued the opinion, neither party raised this point on appeal. 621 F.2d at 1268-69.
Once a party desiring modification or termination of a collective bargaining agreement
notifies the other party, and the Director of the FMCS establishes a board inquiry, the
board must conduct an investigation and make a written report thereon to the parties
within 15 days of the establishment of the board. 29 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1976). Congress thus im-
posed specific time constraints on each of these procedural steps.
Rapid settlement of labor disputes in the health care industry was of particular con-
cern to Congress when it amended the NLRA to cover employees of nonprofit hospitals. S.
REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3946, 3946-49. Senator Javits noted in debate that Congress needed to amend the NLRA to
provide special procedures to resolve labor disputes in the health care industry. 120 CONG.
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opinion that the situation substantially threatened to interrupt health
care delivery to the locality that Sinai served.- Sinai then petitioned the
district court for an order enjoining the Board from conducting the in-
vestigation."
In support of its petition, Sinai argued that the Director's decision to
establish the Board was subject to judicial reviewY Since the Director's
opinion was necessary to the validity of the Board,28 Sinai maintained
that the opinion should not merely have tracked the statutory language
requiring that the Director make certain findings before establishing a
board of inquiry.' Instead, Sinai contended that the Director should
have provided factual findings for a court to consider when reviewing
whether the establishment of a board were warranted. 0 The district
court denied Sinai's request for an injunction."1
Sinai appealed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court.3
The Fourth Circuit determined that the issue of whether factual findings
must support the Director's opinion hinged on whether the decision to
establish the Board were subject to judicial review.u The Fourth Circuit
REC. 12,939. One such special procedural designed to achieve the goal was the extension
from 60 to 90 days referred to above. Id.
1 621 F.2d at 1268-69. The Director's opinion virtually tracked the language of § 183(a).
See 29 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1976); note 24 supra. The Director stated in his opinion, "At the time
I [decided to appoint the Board] ... I found subtantial reasons ... to believe that the threat
of a strike or lockout affecting [Sinai's] ... health care facility existed." Brief for Appellee at
13.
621 F.2d at 1268-69.
Brief for Appellant at 9.
See note 24 supra.
Brief for Appellant at 9; see notes 24 & 25 supra.
Brief for Appellant at 9. Sinai relied on several United States Supreme Court cases
to support its contention that the Director should have included factual findings in his opi-
nion. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141-42 (1973) (per curiam); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). Sinai in essence maintained that factual
findings were necessary to insure that the Director had not abused his discretion by acting
arbitrarily or capriciously. Brief for Appellant at 9-10. Sinai's argument was inappropriate,
however, because the cases it cites concern administrative actions that are final orders
under the APA. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. at 140; Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 406. In contrast, the formation of a board of inquiry is not a final
"order." See note 2 supra.
,1 621 F.2d at 1269. The district court denied the injunction because the appointment
of a board is not a final "order" under the APA. Brief for Appellant at 2; see notes 2 & 30
supra. Furthermore, the Director did file an opinion with the district cdurt subsequent to
the establishment of the Board. While the Director's opinion merely tracked the statutory
language, the district court found that the Director had an adequate basis for making the
findings referred to in his opinion. Brief for Appellee at 2, 13; see notes 24 & 25 supra. Finally,
the district court refused to inquire further into the propriety of the Director's decision
because there was no evidence that the decision was an abuse of discretion. Brief for Ap-
pellee at 2. Since the issue of abuse of discretion arises only when administrative actions are
final orders, the latter finding was unwarranted. See note 30 supra.
621 F.2d at 1269.
Id. at 1270.
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noted that the Director's decision to establish a board of inquiry is
discretionary.' A discretionary action generally is not reviewable
because it does not constitute a final disposition of the rights of parties
and is advisory." The court asserted that courts should review a discre-
tionary action only when the administrator's action contravenes express
statutory authority.' The Fourth Circuit decided that the Director's
decision to establish the Board was not in derogation of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 7
The court's statement that the establishment of the Board was
discretionary" should have signaled that a section 701(a)(2)39 analysis
would follow because that section covers discretionary administrative
decisions.' Instead, the court shifted to a discussion of whether a court
may infer reviewability since the statute creating the FMCS does not ex-
pressly authorize review." Courts usually confront the issue of inferred
judicial review when dealing with section 701(a)(1). 2 To decide whether
34 Id. at 1269; see note 24 supra.
1 621 F.2d at 1269; see notes 2, 30 & 31 supra.
w 621 F.2d at 1269. The Fourth Circuit relied on Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958),
to support the rule that reviewability exists when an administrator's action is in plain
derogation of his statutory powers. 621 F.2d at 1269. See text accompanying notes 55-56 in-
fra.
, 621 F.2d at 1269. The court observed that a Leedom v. Kyne situation was at issue
in Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Scearce, 561 F.2d 547, 547 (4th Cir. 1977). The earlier
Sinai case was virtually identical to the Sinai case under discussion. The parties to the col-
lective bargaining agreement in the earlier case were the same, and the validity of the
establishment of a board of inquiry was also at issue. See id. at 550-51; note 20 supra. Sinai
charged that the appointment of a board of inquiry was untimely because such appointment
did not occur within the statutorily prescribed 30 days after receipt of notification of a
dispute between Sinai and the union. 561 F.2d at 551-52. See note 23 supra. The hospital also
argued that formal findings of fact were required before the Director of the FMCS could
establish a board of inquiry. 561 F.2d at 551. The Fourth Circuit found that the FMCS failed
to establish a board of inquiry in a timely fashion and therefore enjoined the board from in-
vestigating the dispute. Id at 553-54. Having so disposed of that issue, the court did not
reach the second of Sinai's arguments. Id.
621 F.2d at 1269.
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976).
4 Id.; see text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
41 621 F.2d at 1270. Section 183(a) does not authorize judicial review of the Director's
decision to convene a board of inquiry. 29 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1976).
" 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1976). The Fourth Circuit relied on two United States Supreme
Court cases to illustrate the principle that a court may imply reviewability if a statute does
not expressly grant judicial review of an agency action. 621 F.2d at 1270; see generally Mor-
ris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977); Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S.
297 (1943). In Morris, the Court stated that the principle applies in the context of a §
701(a)(1) problem rather than a § 701(a)(2) problem. 432 U.S. at 500-01. Switchmen's Union is
a pre-APA case. However, the Court's statement in Switchmen's Union that a court may in-
fer judicial review where the statute does not specifically provide for review embodies the
concept behind § 701(a)(1). 320 U.S. at 301; see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1976). Indeed, the Court in
Morris relied on Switchmen's Union to support the principle that a court may imply
reviewability if the applicable statute does not provide for judicial review. 432 U.S. at 501.
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the court should imply reviewability under section 701(a)(1), 41 the Fourth
Circuit employed a tripartite test"4 which other circuits have used when
confronted with the problem of whether a particular agency action is by
law committed to agency discretion under section 701(a)(2).4
The court first examined the need for court supervision to protect
the plaintiffs interest. The Fourth Circuit commented that a board
merely mediates labor disputes on behalf of the FMCS Director. Because
a board's recommendations are not binding, but purely advisory, the
Fourth Circuit found that judicial supervision was unnecessary to pro-
tect Sinai's interest.46 Secondly, the Fourth Circuit probed the probable
impact of allowing review on the FMCS' ability to execute its statutory
functions. The NLRA requires that the party wishing to terminate or
modify a collective bargaining contract pertaining to the health care in-
dustry inform the FMCS of its intentions at least sixty days before the
contract is to expire. Notice to the FMCS is one step in a carefully timed
procedure that Congress has legislated in an effort to afford ample time
for the FMCS to mediate a controversy and avoid a potentially
disastrous work stoppage in the vital medical care industry. In Sinai
Hospita4 the court determined that judicial review of the decision to
establish a board of inquiry would undermine the efficacy of this pro-
cedure. Since permitting judicial review before the completion of the
process would delay the orderly and rapid resolution of a controversy,
the court stated that review would frustrate a board's role in mediating
a labor dispute.48 Finally, the Fourth Circuit considered the ap-
propriateness of judicial review of the Director's action and reasoned
that the decision to establish a board of inquiry required the special ex-
pertise of the Director of the FMCS. 49 The Fourth Circuit concluded,
" 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1976).
" 621 F.2d at 1270-71.
1 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976). An influential law review article first announced that a
court confronted with the issue of whether a particular action were discretionary should
consider three factors. See H. Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of
"Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REv. 367, 371 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Saferstein]. The factors are the need for court supervision to protect the parties' interests,
the potential impact of allowing review on agency effectiveness and the appropriateness of
permitting judicial review. Id. Other circuits have adopted the three-pronged test. See, e.g.,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Davis
Assoc., Inc. v. HUD, 498 F.2d 385, 390 (1st Cir. 1974); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1249
(lst Cir. 1970); Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 443 (2d Cir. 1969).
4 621 F.2d at 1270. If the Board's decision were binding on the parties to a labor
dispute, the decision would be a reviewable "order" under § 702 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1976). See note 2 supra. Of course, § 702 would not apply if either of the statutory excep-
tions of § 701 of the APA applied. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1976); see text accompanying notes 4-7
supra.
4 621 F.2d at 1270-71; see note 23 supra.
621 F.2d at 1270-71; see notes 23-24 supra.
'9 621 F.2d at 1271. Administrative agencies have developed in response to an increas-
ingly complex society where specialists in complicated fields are necessary to execute laws
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therefore, that the Director's decision was not an administrative action
appropriate for judicial reviewW In Sinai Hospital, therefore, the court
employed a section 701(a)(2)51 analysis while couching the issue of
reviewability of the Director's decision in terms of section 701(a)(1).1
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Sinai Hospital is also confused
because the court incorrectly relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Leedom v. Kyne' for the proposition that the Director's decision would
be subject to review if he violated a statutory mandate.' In Leedom, the
NLRB had failed to take a statutorily required vote of professional
employees to determine whether they wished to be part of a bargaining
unit composed of professionals and nonprofessionals.5 The Court decided
that the action was reviewable because it contravened a statutory man-
date.' In Sinai Hospital, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that Leedom would
apply to the Director's discretionary decision to establish a board if the
decision contravened his statutory authority. The Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that no such situation existed .5 The court's discussion of Leedom
in the context of the discretionary decision to establish the Board was in-
appropriate. The Director's establishment of the Board involved no ac-
tion in compliance with or in derogation of a statute." The Director's
decision stemmed entirely from his assessment that the factual situation
warranted a board's mediation.5 ' Leedom is irrelevant to an ad-
regulating their particular areas of expertise. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351
U.S. 192, 203 (1956). Courts frequently defer to such particularized knowledge and decline to
review an agency action because of the agency's superior understanding of the issues which
the action involves. Whitney Nat. Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411,
420 (1965).
' 621 F.2d at 1271. Sinai also maintained on appeal that even if the Director's decision
were not reviewable, the opinion should at least state that the parties to the labor dispute
had reached an impasse in negotiations. Id The Fourth Circuit found, however, that the ap-
plicable statute does not require that the opinion state that an impasse exists. Id.; see note
24 supra. In addition, the court noted that if the Director waited until impasse to appoint
the Board, the value of the Board as a mediating device would diminish. 621 F.2d at 1271. A
board of inquiry attempts through mediation to prevent impasses, which signal the im-
minence of a breakdown in negotiations and resultant strikes. To allow a board to step in only
after an impasse occurred would eradicate the preventive function of the board. Id. The
Fourth Circuit relied on legislative history to support the position that the effectiveness of
the Board as a mediating device would be eliminated if the Director waited until an impasse
existed before he established the Board. 621 F.2d at 1271.
1, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976).
Yd. § 701(a)(1); see 621 F.2d at 1271.
358 U.S. 184 (1958).
See 621 F.2d at 1269.
358 U.S. at 188-89.
Id. at 189-90.
621 F.2d at 1269.
See id. at 1268-69. The Director's decision to establish the Board hinged on his
assessment that the facts threatened a substantial interruption of health care delivery to
the locality which Sinai served. See notes 24 & 25 supra.
1 621 F.2d at 1268-69; see note 25 supra.
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ministrative action based entirely on a factual determination; it applies
only when there is a clear violation of the law."
Aside from the unfortunate discussion of inferring reviewability,6 1
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Sinai Hospital is sound. The court
recognized that the establishment of a board of inquiry is within the
discretion of the Director of the FMCS.62 In support of its conclusion, the
court applied the three-pronged test which other circuits have used to
determine whether an administrative action falls within the parameters
of section 701(a)(2).1 The conclusion that the Sinai Hospital facts satisfy
this testu reflects a reasoned exercise of common sense. In particular,
the Fourth Circuit demonstrated an awareness of the crucial importance
of following the precise time schedule that Congress designed to avoid
strikes in the health care industry. 5 Other courts that have addressed
the problem of review of the Director's decision to establish a board of
inquiry have concluded that review is unavailable.6 The courts reasoned
that the decision to establish a board requires considerable ad-
ministrative expertise, and courts therefore should not interfere with
the agency's decision. 7 Furthermore, the courts agreed with the Fourth
Circuit that to allow review would jeopardize the speedy resolution of
labor disputes through the carefully planned procedure which Congress
legislated."
Reviewability of an agency action was also at issue in Associated
Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Irving."9 In Associated Builders,
Associated Builders and Contractors (ABC), an associated of contractors,
subcontractors and suppliers, filed an unfair labor practices charge with
the NLRB.7" ABC alleged in the charge that a clause in the collective
bargaining agreement between certain labor unions and an employer
constituted an unlawful "hot cargo agreement."71 The NLRB Regional
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. at 189-90 (1958).
El See text accompanying notes 34-45 supra.
621 F.2d at 1269.
' 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976); see text accompanying notes 43-52 supra.
621 F.2d at 1270-71.
See note 24 supra.
St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Horvitz, 97 L.R.R.M. 3105, 3107 (N.D.N.Y. 1978), appeal
dismissed, 99 L.R.R.M. 2249 (2d 1978); Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Scearce, 93 L.R.R.M.
2885, 2893-94 (D. Md. 1976). rev'd on other grounds, 561 F.2d 547 (4th Cir. 1977).
97 L.R.R.M. at 3107; 93 L.R.R.M. at 2885.
97 L.R.R.M. at 3107; 93 L.R.R.M. at 2893-94; see note 24 supra.
610 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980).
71 Id. at 1222; see note 10 supra.
71 610 F.2d at 1222-23. In the charge, Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. (ABC)
referred to a written agreement between the Mass Transit Authority (MTA), an instrumen-
tality of the Maryland Department of Transportation, and certain labor organizations. Id.
The contract established conditions of employment in connection with the construction of
the Baltimore Region Rapid Transit System. Id. While the contract stated that it did not
limit the selection or utilization of contractors or subcontractors, the contract did provide
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Director refused to file a complaint 2 because the employer was a state
agency and therefore did not fall within the statutory definition of
"employer" in the NLRA.3 Consequently, the NLRA's regulations did
that such contractors and subcontractors were bound by the agreement. Id. The clause
nullified the disclaimer since a contractor or subcontractor either had to agree to adhere to
the contract or else not work on the project. Id. ABC opposed the contract because it
limited the choice of subcontractors by ABC member contractors to subcontractors
dominated not by ABC members but by the union. Id. at 1222. ABC alleged that the clause
required that all contractors and subcontractors on the project sign the union contract, and
that the clause therefore was a "hot cargo agreement." Id.
"Hot cargo agreement" is the generic term describing an agreement between an
employer and a labor organization requiring that the employer not deal in goods of a person
who is involved in a designated labor dispute. Cox. supra note 10, at 872. Section 8(e) of the
NLRA declares that a labor organization and an employer commit an unfair labor practice
when they agree that the employer will not do business with another employer. 29 U.S.C. §
158(e) (1976). Section 8(e) clearly makes hot cargo provisions unlawful. National Woodwork
Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 635-37 (1967). Section 8(e), however, does not apply to an
agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry when
the agreement relates to contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at a construction
site. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976); see 386 U.S. at 637-38.
The construction industry proviso at the end of § 8(e) evidently relates only to con-
struction work at a single job site. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616,
628-31 (1975). Because tension might arise when union and nonunion workers work in close
proximity, hot cargo argeement that apply to a single job site are permissible. Id.
" See note 10 supra.
" 610 F.2d at 1223. Section 2(2) of the NLRA specifically excludes state government
employers from its coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
The Fourth Circuit commented that the NLRB's interpretation of "employer" has been
inconsistent. 610 F.2d at 1227. Originally, the NLRB's position was that the ban on hot cargo
provisions was as broad as the secondary boycott ban of § 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4)(B) (1976). Lufthansa German Airlines, 80 L.R.R.M. 1305, 1307-11 (1972). The
NLRB considered a hot cargo provision invalid not only if it were between a labor organiza-
tion and a statutory "employer," but also if it were between a labor organization and any
"person." Marriott Corp. v. NLRB, 491 F.2d 367, 370 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881
(1974). Compare, 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1976) with id. § 152(2). In a split decision, the NLRB
subsequently overruled Lufthansa. Local 3, IBEW, 102 L.R.R.M. 1285, 1286 (1979). The
NLRB in Local 3 relied primarily on the literal language of § 8(e) to hold that the section ap-
plied only to hot cargo agreements between labor organizations and statutory employers.
Id. at 1287. The suspect contract in Local 3 was between FDC, a facility of New York State,
and a labor union. Because "employer" does not include government entities such as FDC,
the contract could not be a hot cargo provision. Id.
The Fourth Circuit clearly believed that the Local 3 decision was incorrect and would
have preferred to have followed Lufthansa. 610 F.2d at 1227. Had the court adopted the
Lufthansa reasoning, however, the General Counsel's decision not to issue the complaint
would have been in blatant derogation of the statute, because the General Counsel's deci-
sion that the Mass Transit Authority (MTA) was not an "employer" would have contraven-
ed the statutory definition of "employer" as interpreted in Lufthansa. The General
Counsel's decision therefore would be reviewable under the rule set forth in Leedom v.
Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). See 610 F.2d at 1227. Leedom held that an administrator's acts
are subject to review if they are beyond the scope of his statutorily delegated powers. 358
U.S. at 190; see note 36 supra. Had the Fourth Circuit declared the decision reviewable, the
court would have been in direct conflict with courts that have decided the reviewability
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not cover the collective bargaining agreement.7 4 The NLRB General
Counsel affirmed the Regional Director's ruling." In district court ABC
sought a declaratory judgment76 that the General Counsel's finding was
erroneous and a writ of mandamus"1 compelling the General Counsel to
issue an unfair labor practices complaint.78 The district court granted the
General Counsel's motion to dismiss ABC's petition, finding that the
court lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter. 9 The Fourth Circuit
unanimously affirmed the dismissal. 0
In determining whether the General Counsel's decision were review-
able, the Fourth Circuit considered the interplay between section 3(d)'
of the NLRA, which sets forth the duties of the General Counsel, 2 and
issue. See note 96 infra. The court interpreted the conflicting stances of the NLRB on the
definition of "employer" as a reflection of the lack of clarity in § 8(e). 610 F.2d at 1227. The
Fourth Circuit concluded that this ambiguity prevented it from determining whether the
General Counsel plainly exceeded his statutory authority when he refused to issue the com-
plaint. Id. Because it was not obvious that the General Counsel violated the statute by not
issuing an unfair labor practices complaint, the decision was not reviewable. 610 F.2d at
1227; see Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
A simple rule of statutory interpretation shows that the Local 3 decision rather than
Lufthansa correctly decided the issue of whether § 8(e) covers only statutory employers or
all persons. The legislature's own definitions of statutory terms control. A. J. SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 20.08 (4th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as SUTHERLAND]. Section
8(e) refers to hot cargo agreements between labor organizations and "employers" 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(e) (1976). Section 2(2) excludes government entities from the definition of "employer."
Id. § 152(2). The alleged hot cargo agreement at issue in Associated Builders was between a
union and MTA, a state government entity. 610 F.2d at 1222. Therefore, MTA was not an
"employer," and § 8(e) was inapplicable under the above principle. The General Counsel's
decision was correct.
", 610 F.2d at 1223.
' Id.; see note 10 supra.
76 A court may declare the rights and legal relations of any interested party seeking
such a declaration. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976 & Supp. H 1978). In addition, a court may further
grant necessary or proper relief. Id. § 2202 (emphasis added). These sections comprise the
Declaratory Judgment Act, which does not confer jurisdiction upon a court, but merely af-
fords an additional remedy if a court already has jurisdiction. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petrol. Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950).
1 Courts issue writs of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976). A mandamus
writ commands an inferior court, a private or municipal corporation, or an executive, ad-
ministrative or judicial officer to perform certain acts relating to a public, official or
ministerial duty. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 866 (5th ed. 1979). Section 1651 does not grant
jurisdiction to a district court. To issue the writ the court must already possess jurisdiction.
9 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.29 (2d ed. 1980).
78 610 F.2d at 1223.
79 Id.
Id at 1222.
" 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976). Section 3(d) gives the General Counsel general supervisory
powers over all NLRB attorneys, officers and employees in NLRB regional offices. Id. The
General Counsel also has final authority, on behalf of the NLRB, to investigate unfair labor
practice charges, issue unfair labor practice complaints and prosecute such complaints. Id.
" See note 81 supra.
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sections 701(a)l and 702' of the APA 5 Section 70288 provides for broad
judicial review of administrative actions,87 but section 701(a)' limits the
scope of section 702.89 The court observed that the General Counsel's
decision not to issue a complaint would be reviewable unless one of the
section 701(a)0 exceptions to reviewability applied.9' Since the NLRA
does not provide expressly for judicial review of the General Counsel's
decision not to issue a complaint, 2 the Fourth Circuit did not consider
the exemption under section 701(a)(1).93 Instead, the court analyzed
whether section 3(d)94 of the NLRA by law committed the decision not to
issue a complaint to the General Counsel's discretion, and therefore
whether the section 701(a)(2)95 exception applied.
The Fourth Circuit found that the legislative history of the NLRA
indicated that Congress designed the position of General Counsel to be a
political similar to that of an attorney general. Congress intended that
the General Counsel's political responsibility should limit his discretion
in issuing complaints98 and that the General Counsel's refusal to issue a
complaint should not be subject to judicial review.99 The Fourth Circuit
buttressed its finding of nonreviewability by noting that other courts
have acknowledged that judicial review of the decision not to issue a
complaint is unavailable."'9
- 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976).
Id. § 702.
' 610 F.2d at 1224.
- 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
8 See note 2 supra.
5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976).
See text accompanying notes 4-7 supra.
' 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976).
81 610 F.2d at 1224; see text accompanying notes 4-7 supra.
' Any person aggrieved by a final NLRB order may obtain judicial review thereof. 29
U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976). See note 2 supra. Unfair labor practice complaints are not "final
orders" within the meaning of § 160(f). Hourihan v. NLRB, 201 F.2d 187, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 930 (1953); Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306, 307 (1st Cir. 1948).
" 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1976); see notes 4-5 supra.
" 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976).
" Id. § 701(a)(2); see notes 6-7 supra.
" 610 F.2d at 1224.
97I1&
" Id. at 1224. With the advice and consent of the Senate, the President appoints the
General Counsel for a four-year term. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976).
610 F.2d at 1224.
' 610 F.2d at 1224-25; see Bays v. Miller, 524 F.2d 631 634 (9th Cir. 1975); Hernandez v.
NLRB, 505 F.2d 119, 120 (5th Cir. 1975); Erie Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 489 F.2d 416, 426
(3d Cir. 1973); Mayer v. Ordman, 391 F.2d 889, 889 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 925
(1968); Wellington Mill Div. West Point Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 579, 590 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964); Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Ordman, 320 F.2d
729, 730 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
The United States Supreme Court has stated in dicta that the decision not to issue a
complaint is unreviewable. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 138 (1975);
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The Fourth Circuit dismissed the request for review because federal
courts lack jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the decision not to
issue a complaint.' The court cautioned, however, that it would have
jurisdiction if the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint were
based on a clear mistake of law." 2 When the General Counsel makes an
obvious mistake of law, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that his refusal con-
stitutes an action in excess of the General Counsel's statutorily
delegated powers."0 3 Since a court always has jurisdiction to review an
agency's action in excess of its statutory power," ' the Fourth Circuit
held that the General Counsel's decision would be reviewable if the deci-
sion patently contradicted the NLRA.0 ' The Fourth Circuit reasoned,
however, that the General Counsel's determination in Associated
Builders that the employer was not an "employer" under the NLRA was
not so clearly erroneous as to constitute an act beyond his delegated
Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 303-04 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967). In Sears, the employer
sought disclosure of certain memoranda which the General Counsel generated in deciding
whether to issue an unfair labor practice complaint. 421 U.S. at 135-36. The Court noted in
dicta that the decision not to file a complaint is unreviewable. Id at 138-39. In Lockridge,
respondent claimed that his discharge from employment because of union dues arrearage
was an unfair labor practice. 403 U.S. at 278-79. The Court found that the discharge was a
matter that Congress intended to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. Id. at
287-88. The dissent observed that the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint was
evidently not subject to judicial review. Id. at 303-04 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Vaca, the
NLRB charged a union with violating its duty of fair representation. 386 U.S. at 173. The
Vaca Court found that Congress did not intend to grant the NLRB exclusive jurisdiction
when a union member alleges a violation of the duty of fair representation. Id at 178-82. In
dicta, the Court observed that a decision not to issue a complaint involved unreviewable
discretion. Id at 182.
101 610 F.2d at 1226.
Id. at 1227.
103 Id.
10, Id. at 1226-27; see Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 187-90 (1958); Harmon v. Brucker,
355 U.S. 579, 582 (1958) (per curiam); Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc. 356 U.S. 309, 317
(1957); text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
In Harmon, a veteran received a less than honorable discharge because of pre-induction
activities. The statute in question required that the Secretary of the Army base a veteran's
discharge status upon the veteran's record as a member of the Armed Forces. 355 U.S. at
583. The Court concluded that the dishonorable discharge constituted an action beyond the
Secretary's statutory powers and thus that judicial review was possible. Id
In Panama Canal, shipping companies using the Panama Canal sued the Panama Canal
Company (Company) to force the Company to prescribe lower tolls and to refund tolls that
the Company allegedly had illegally withheld. 356 U.S. at 310-14. Under a federal statute,
the Company could change toll rates, but only in accordance with a statutorily specified for-
mula. Id. at 313. The Court held that the controversy was not one for judicial review under
the APA because the matter involved complicated issues of statutory construction and cost
accounting which Congress had left to the Company's discretion. Id at 317. Moreover, the
Court noted that the Company had not made a clear mistake of law. Id. By implication, if the
Company had made an obvious mistake, the Court would have taken jurisdiction.
3 610 F.2d at 1227-28.
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powers." 6 The General Counsel's decision was therefore not
reviewable.10
Other courts that have considered whether the General Counsel's
decision not to issue a complaint is reviewable have unanimously held
that it is not."8 Most of the decisions do not explain their failure to find
subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, the courts summarily hold that the
unavailability of judicial review is beyond dispute.1" The few cases that
examine the issue in more detail fall into at least four analytical
categories. Some courts note that the NLRB was originally responsible
for issuing a complaint.110 Judicial review was available only for final
NLRB orders.1 Since a complaint was not a final order, the NLRB's find-
ing that a complaint was not warranted was not subject to judicial
review.1 The Taft-Hartley Amendments shifted the duty to issue com-
plaints from the NLRB to the General Counsel.1 The cases in this
category note that Congress did not change the jurisdictional language
of the statute providing that judicial review is available only for final
NLRB orders."' Generally, congressional failure to amend all of a statute
indicates that Congress intended the portion of the statute which it did
not amend to remain in effect.115 Courts applying this principle have in-
ferred that Congress intended that the decision not to issue a complaint
should continue to be nonreviewable.118
One court has observed that courts have consistently refused to
allow review.1 The court applied the rule of statutory construction that
failure to amend a statute which courts have construed constitutes
legislative approval of the judicial construction.1 The court therefore
determined that congressional failure to amend the NLRA to provide for
Id. at 1227; see note 73 supra.
10 610 F.2d at 1228.
102 See cases cited in note 100 supra.
0 See, e.g., Wellington Mill Div., West Point Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 579, 590 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964). The Fourth Circuit cited its decision in Wellington as
dispositive of the issue in Associated Builders. 610 F.2d at 1225 n.8. Wellington is typical of
the cursory treatment courts usually give the problem. In Wellington, the General Counsel
declined to include in an unfair labor practices complaint an employee's allegation of
discriminatory discharge. 330 F.2d at 590. The Fourth Circuit held that the scope of a com-
plaint is within the discretion of the General Counsel. Id. The court observed without
discussion that the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint is final and unreviewable.
1d,
10 Drivers Local 886 v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 492, 494 (10th Cir. 1950); Lincourt v. NLRB,
170 F.2d 306, 307 (1st Cir. 1948).
179 F.2d at 494; see note 10 supra.
. 179 F.2d at 494.
" See note 10 supra.
114 See, e.g., 179 F.2d at 494. See note 10 supra.
11. SUTHERLAND, supra note 73, at § 22.35.
110 See 179 F.2d at 495.
1? Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214, 215 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972).
"' SUTHERLAND, supra note 73, at § 22.35.
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judicial review of the General Counsel's decision indicated that Congress
sanctioned nonreviewability."9 Another court has treated the decision
not to issue a complaint as an action requiring administrative expertise
which the courts do not possess.'12 Finally, some courts, like the Fourth
Circuit in Associated Builders, have reasoned that the General Counsel's
decision is analogous to that of a prosecutor. 1 ' Since a prosecutor has
unreviewable discretion to decide whether to initiate a prosecution, the
courts have concluded that the General Counsel's refusal to issue a com-
plaint is not reviewable."
In contrast to its application of Leedom v. Kyne in Sinai Hospita4'
the Fourth Circuit's application of Leedom in Associated Builders was
appropriate. The Fourth Circuit in Associated Builders concluded that
the decision of the NLRB General Counsel not to issue an unfair labor
practices complaint was an action committed by law to agency discretion
under section 701(a)(2)... of the APA.15 The court did not arrive at the
conclusion by employing the three-pronged test employed in Sinai
Hospital.' Rather, the court relied on an impressive body of case law
holding the decision unreviewable and on the legislative history of the
NLRA. 1' The Fourth Circuit correctly interpreted Leedom as dictating
1" 463 F.2d at 216.
' Jacobsen v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 1941). Jacobsen was decided before Con-
gress passed the Taft-Hartley Amendments, and hence before the task of issuing complaints
became the province of the General Counsel. See note 10 supra. Because the statutory
language governing the review of final orders under the NLRA did not change when Con-
gress passed the Taft-Hartley Amendments, the Jacobsen reasoning should remain viable.
"' See, e.g., Mayer v. Ordman, 391 F.2d 889, 891 n.2 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 925
(1968); Dunn v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 307 F.2d 285, 288 (2d Cir. 1962). See also
Rosenblum, A New Look at the General Counsel's Unreviewable Discretion Not to Issue a
Complaint Under the NLRA, 86 YALE L. J. 1349, 1378-82 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Rosenblum]; Note, Judicial Reviewability of NLRB Rulings, 63 Nw. L. REv. 106, 116 (1968).
1 See Dunn v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 307 F.2d at 288.
' See text accompanying notes 53-60 supra.
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976).
610 F.2d at 1224.
1 See text accompanying notes 43-50 supra.
' 610 F.2d at 1224-26. The Fourth Circuit found that Congress intended the General
Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint to be comparable to a prosecutor's decision not to in-
itiate criminal proceedings. Id. at 1224. The United States Supreme Court has similarly
noted differences between a prosecutor's decision not to initiate criminal proceedings and
the General Counsel's decision not to issue an unfair labor practices complaint. NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 156 n.22 (1975). The Court observed that unlike most
prosecutors, the General Counsel may initiate a complaint only if an aggrieved party files an
unfair labor practice charge. Id. Furthermore, the charging party, unlike a victim of a crime,
becomes a party to the proceeding before the NLRB if a complaint issues. Id. One commen-
tator has criticized the analogy by observing that Congress has given the General Counsel
more guidelines to follow in deciding when a complaint should issue than it has given a
public prosecutor. Rosenblum, supra note 121, at 1379-81. Because of personnel and financial
constraints, prosecutors need considerable discretion in deciding whether to bring a case to
trial. Id. The General Counsel suffers from fewer financial and staff limitations than do most
prosecutors. Id
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an exception to the nonreviewability of a discretionary action when that
action results from a clear mistake of law.1" The General Counsel refused
to issue the unfair labor practices complaint in Associated Builders
because he believed that the NLRA did not cover the employer. Because
the Fourth Circuit could not determine that this conclusion of law was in
derogation of the NLRA, the court properly concluded that the Leedom
exception to nonreviewability was inapplicable."
Associated Builders falls squarely within case law establishing that
the NLRB General Counsel's decision not to issue an unfair labor prac-
tices complaint is not generally reviewable. 1 ' But, like most courts, the
Fourth Circuit too willingly adheres to precedent and consequently does
not engage in a probing analysis of the problem.13' If the court had ex-
amined the issue, the court would have found that the nonreviewability
principle is inconsistent with the policy of the NLRA to avoid labor
unrest by fostering employee organization and collective bargaining.'32
The General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint without giving both
parties to a dispute a hearing at which a neutral third party weighs all
relevant evidence'" can only foster tension between the charging party
and the person charged. Moreover, a close analysis would reveal that im-
portant legal issues can escape NLRB and court consideration if the
General Counsel simply decides not to file a complaint." Clearly, some
review of the General Counsel's decision is warranted.
" 610 F.2d at 1227; see text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
" 610 F.2d at 1225; see note 73 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 108-122 supra.
31 Even some commentators aver without discussion that General Counsel's decision
not to issue a complaint is not reviewable. See, e.g., Saferstein, supra note 45, at 368.
However, one commentator has criticized the analysis in cases deciding the issue as "sheep-
like adherence to previous and equally shallow opinions." McClintock, supra note 10, at 100.
See also Rosenblum, supra note 121, at 1349-68.
1 See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257-58 (1939); Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 44 (1938).
13 The applicable federal regulation provides that the charging party will submit
evidence in support of his charge, and the person charged will submit a statement of his
position. 29 C.F.R. § 101.8 (1980). No adversary hearing can take place until a complaint
issues. Id. One court that considered the issue held that the absence of a hearing does not
violate the Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. ART. V. Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214, 215 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972).
" See generally Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975). Con-
nell presents the most glaring example of how an important legal issue can be kept from
NLRB scrutiny. The General Counsel had interpreted 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) to permit construc-
tion industry unions to enter into agreements with contractors not to do business with non-
union subcontractors. 421 U.S. at 618-21. The General Counsel's interpretation remained in
effect despite heavy criticism thereof. Rosenblum, supra note 121, at 1367. No final order
had issued in Connell because no complaint had issued. See note 2 supra. The federal courts,
however, assumed jurisdiction when plaintiffs alleged a violation of the federal antitrust
laws. 421 U.S. at 622-26, 635. The Court held that such agreements were illegal, except as
they applied to single job sites. Id. at 633.
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The Supreme Court has cautioned that the section 701(a)(2)3 excep-
tion to the presumption of judicial review of administrative actions is
very narrow. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 13 the Court
held that an action is committed to agency discretion and therefore
within the scope of section 701(a)(2)137 only when the statute creating the
agency is so broad that there is no law to apply to a given set of facts."
The Fourth Circuit's treatment of reviewability under section 701(a)(2) 9
substantiates criticism by commentators that the Overton Park rule is
vague and largely unworkable. 4 ' In one early case the court easily ap-
plied the Overton Park formula to find that the denial by the Military
Traffic Management and Terminal Service of a moving company's re-
quest that the company be exempt from certain regulations was
reviewable."' In another case, however, the court stated that it was
following Overton Park when in fact it used a separate line of reasoning
to determine that withholding by the Environmental Protection Agency
of money statutorily authorized to reduce water pollution was an action
committed to agency discretion and therefore unreviewable.4 The
13 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976).
135 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). In Over-
ton Park the applicable statute prohibited the use of federal funds for highways through
parks if a feasible alternate route existed. Id. at 405. The Secretary of the Interior authorized
such funds without making any finding. Id. at 408. A group of concerned citizens challenged
the action. Id. The first issue before the Court was whether the action were reviewable. Id.
at 410.
13 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976).
' 401 U.S. at 410-11.
5  U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976).
140 4 DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.16 (Supp. 1980). Professor Davis il-
lustrates his contention that the Overton Park, holding is unworkable by asking whether
courts have "law to apply" when the General Counsel decides not to issue a complaint. Id
Davis notes that if the General Counsel has refused to issue a complaint several times in the
past when similar facts have arisen, courts have "law to apply" under Overton Park Id.
However, having law to apply would mean that the decision not to issue a complaint is
reviewable because it is not committed to agency discretion. Application of Overton Park
would contravene the unanimous case law holding the decision unreviewable. Id.; see text
accompanying notes 108-122 supra.
141 W.G. Cosby Transfer & Storage Corp. v. Froehlke, 480 F.2d 498, 500-01 (4th Cir.
1973). In Cosby, the Commander of Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service
denied a request that a moving company be exempt from a regulation specifying that mov-
ing companies could represent only four international carriers. Id. The company sought
judicial review of this denial, and the Government countered that the denial was exempt
from review under § 701(a)(2). Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976). The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that there was law to apply and applied Overton Park to hold that the action was
reviewable. 480 F.2d at 501.
1"2 See generally Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1973). In
Train, an environmental group challenged the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
withholding of part of the maximum sum statutorily authorized to combat water pollution.
Id at 493-94. The EPA asserted that its decision was an unreviewable action under §
701(a)(2) of the APA. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976). The Fourth Circuit decided that
Overton Park applied, but it did not use Overton Park to determine whether the EPA ac-
